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Abstract Much of the Internet economy relies on online advertising for monetizing
digital content: Users are expected to accept the presence of online advertisements
in exchange for content being free. However, online advertisements have become a
serious problem for many Internet users: while some are merely annoyed by the in-
cessant display of distracting ads cluttering Web pages, others are highly concerned
about the privacy implications – as ad providers typically track users’ behavior for
ad targeting purposes. Similarly, security problems related to technologies and prac-
tices employed for online advertisement have frustrated many users. Consequently, a
number of software solutions have emerged that block online ads from being down-
loaded and displayed on users’ screens as they browse the Web.
We focus on these advertisement avoidance technologies for online content and
their economic ramifications for the monetization of websites. More specifically,
our work addresses the interplay between users’ attempts to avoid commercial mes-
sages and content providers’ design of countermeasures. Our investigation is sub-
stantiated by the development of a game-theoretic model that serves as a framework
usable by content providers to ponder their options to mitigate the consequences of
ad avoidance techniques. We complement our analytical approach with simulation
results, addressing different assumptions about user heterogeneity.
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Our findings show that publishers who treat each user individually, and strategically
deploy fee-financed or ad-financed monetization strategy, obtain higher revenues,
compared to deploying one monetization strategy across all users. In addition, our
analysis shows that understanding the distribution of users’ aversion to ads and val-
uation of the content is essential for publishers to make a well-informed decision.
1 Introduction
It is difficult to produce a television documentary that is both incisive and probing
when every twelve minutes one is interrupted by twelve dancing rabbits singing
about toilet paper. (Rod Serling, 1997)
Consumers and content providers have a love-hate relationship with advertise-
ments. In the area of online news sites, 81% of a surveyed consumer sample report
the acceptance of the presence of online advertising in exchange for content being
free. At the same time, 77% state that they would hardly ever click on these ads [38].
More significantly, across all media channels, 69% say they are “interested in prod-
ucts and services that would help them skip or block marketing messages [42].”
Each media genre is affected with its own specific advertisement circumvention
challenges. During TV commercial breaks, viewers can leave the room to do small
chores. Ads in video recordings can be manually skipped with fast-forwarding or
are automatically marginalized with advanced functions of digital video recorders
(e.g., TiVo) and VCRs [28]. This trend has accelerated with the availability of Home
Theater PC systems such as Windows Media Center, SageTV Media Center and
MythTV where available third-party add-ons allow consumers to conveniently skip
ads (e.g., Comskip and ShowAnalyzer). In telemarketing, consumers are able to
screen calls with CallerID or utilize software tools that act on their behalf (e.g., Tele-
marketing Blocker). Further, regulatory intervention can have a significant impact,
for example, with the US Do-Not-Call list that upon registration allows consumers
to opt out from unsolicited telephone marketing calls [51].
We focus on advertisement avoidance technologies (AATs) for Web content and
their economic ramifications. In the past few years, a number of effective software
solutions have emerged of which the most prominent is perhaps the Adblock Plus
third-party extension for the Firefox browser family [18, 41]. According to up-to-
date statistics provided by Mozilla, Adblock Plus has been downloaded over 172
Million times since July 2006, and has an active daily user base of about 14 Mil-
lion consumers. Further, it is also among the most popular add-ons for the Google
Chrome browser with more than 100,000 weekly installs. Observers from the ad-
vertising business have predicted that the “importance of Adblock is its potential
for extreme menace to the online-advertising business model [21]”. However, many
other technology options exist to block ads.
The emergence of behavioral ad-targeting and the associated increase in advertis-
ers’ incentives for user tracking, has led to what some observers call a “data collec-
tion arms race” (see, for example [10]). Most recently, Google’s proposed changes
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to its privacy policy that would allow for more pervasive user data aggregation have
refreshed privacy concerns in consumers’ minds (see, for example [13]). And con-
sumers object to such practices [33, 48]. However, in absence of truly effective and
wide-spread technologies to opt-in/opt-out from tracking and the later usage of such
information for ads, consumers only have the option to decide on their own per-
sonal mix of avoidance technologies. For example, while consensus for a powerful
and broadly applicable Do-Not-Track mechanism is still absent, some users might
seek to disable scripting languages, Flash or cache cookies.1 Others might use ad-
vanced privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor just for the purpose of evading
such commercially-motivated tracking. Finally, to be effective, avoidance of track-
ing does frequently necessitate also the blocking of the display of ads since ad cam-
paigns almost always involve some form of campaign management tools. While this
is trivially necessary to allow for ad-related payment flows, consumers cannot easily
distinguish between different degrees of tracking severity.
So far, the impact of the circumvention of online tracking and advertisements
has been moderated by the overall growth of the market for Internet commercials.
The Interactive Advertising Bureau estimates that online advertising in the United
States in 2011 totaled $31.7 billion and has grown by 22 percent compared to the
previous year [29]. Nevertheless, many content sites suffer from the burden of ad-
blocking tools, in particular, if they cater to a technology-savvy audience (see, for
example, [24]). The search for an adequate response to this threat has so far proven
inconclusive. In particular, monetization approaches do not only have to be econom-
ically sensible, but need to be accompanied by technically sound implementations.
So far, ad-block deterrence solutions have been notably absent from the market-
place, even though the cost of development and deployment of simple approaches
would be very manageable. In fact, as the majority of ad-blocking tools are based on
filtering out elements whose URLs contain keywords like ad or click, omitting these
keywords would make existing ad-blocking tools ineffective. In addition, existing
tools cannot automatically detect URLs likely to be ads. Therefore, if publishers
start using different keywords, ad-blocking systems would not work [41].
The stakes described in this paper are very high and are relevant beyond the dis-
cussions about the effectiveness of marketing or commercial mechanisms. In fact,
the popularity of Adblock-style add-ons represents only the tip of the iceberg, as
many related challenges are consuming the attention of content producers. For ex-
ample, applications such as Flipboard allow users to conveniently grab pictures and
articles from many different content resources to display them in a variety of user-
defined formats, and ads could be left behind (or replaced).
Our work studies in detail and in a quantitative manner the implications of a
(likely to happen) growing usage of ad-blocking technologies and addresses the
economic justification for effective countermeasures concerning ad avoidance. To
achieve that goal, we develop a game-theoretic model that takes into account the
most relevant parameters, identifies different canonical options (strategies) that the
1 It is unlikely that a meaningful compromise on Do-Not-Track will be reached quickly. See,
for example, the counter-arguments on such technology brought forward by leading content
providers [7].
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content providers and the users can choose from and forecasts the most likely out-
come of such situations. The models we provide rely on Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibria (SPNE) and on Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE). We comple-
ment our analytical approach with simulation results by addressing different as-
sumptions about user heterogeneity. We make ”common sense“ assumptions in
terms of cost and show that in general, content providers are better off when they
make use of a ”mixed approach“, namely when they simultaneously rely on fee-
funded and ad-funded monetization strategies.
The paper is structured as follows. We survey the related work in Section 2.
In Section 3, we introduce the reader to background information relevant to the
problem area of ad avoidance. After briefly laying out the roadmap for our analysis
in Section 4, we delve into the details of our game-theoretic models in Section 5.
We present simulation results in Section 6 and concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Closely related to our work is an economic model by Ta˚g [47]. Content providers de-
cide whether to offer to users a subscription option that eliminates advertisements as
an alternative to the content with advertisements. The content provider would intro-
duce such an option only if the revenue gained from those customers who are will-
ing to pay the subscription fee is greater than the revenue that the content provider
would earn by only offering the basic advertisement model. According to the model,
if the subscription option is introduced, it causes an increase in advertising quantity
in the free version, thus increasing the annoyance due to ads and reducing the per-
ceived quality of the free version. Moreover, consumers’ aggregate utility decreases,
while content providers’ and advertisers’ profits increase. By increasing the amount
of advertisements to non-subscribers, the content provider can further increase the
differentiation between the two options. Prasad et al. [37] analyze the incentives to
price discriminate when consumers are of two given types and a content provider of-
fers two versions differing in advertising quantity and price. They show that offering
two versions (price discrimination) tends to be optimal in most cases.
In another model, Shah accounts for ad avoidance technologies [39]. Users can
invest in ad avoidance options but will still see a certain fraction of the commercials.
A content provider can make use of this fact by optimally differentiating the amount
of advertisements catered to the two groups (i.e., users with and without ad avoid-
ance products). In a two-sided market model for television advertising, Anderson
and Gans similarly show that content providers could increase the number of ads
to those users who do not invest in avoidance technologies, as they are less averse
to advertising [17]. They note that this effect is not solely due to the incentive of
content providers to regain the revenue, but rather due to revealed preferences of
those who do not invest in ad avoidance technologies. In practice, this may be one
of the contributing reasons that larger number of ads per hour are observed in US
television recently (the US does not impose a cap on the number of commercials, in
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contrast to the EU). As a result, overall welfare and program quality could decrease
and programming would be tailored to appeal to a broader range of viewers.
In [52], Wilbur presents a two-sided, empirical model of television advertis-
ing and models the effects of an ad-avoidance technology on an advertisement-
supported media industry. The model considers the following two possibilities. First,
to overcome the loss caused by ad avoidance technologies, networks could increase
the quantity of ads, which makes AAT even more valuable to ad-adverse viewers.
Therefore, this scenario leads to mutually reinforcing increases in AAT penetra-
tion and advertising time. Second, if advertisers value users with AAT less, as they
fast-forward through ads, then non-AAT users become scarce and more valuable.
Due to this self-selection, the remaining market is composed of viewers who ac-
cept ads which might lead to increased ad prices for advertising space. The com-
petition for non-ad-avoiding viewers can lead to lower advertising levels, rendering
ad-avoidance technologies less valuable and slowing down its rate of growth. The
author uses a counterfactual experiment to gain insight into how AAT affects the in-
dustry. It is shown that when AAT penetration increases, then ad levels rise as well.
Nevertheless, increased ATT levels lead to revenue loss, which implies that AAT
might decrease a content provider’s incentives to invest in program quality. Another
model analyzes the impact of ad-avoidance behavior considering two alternative
schemes by which media channels are financed: free-to-air and pay-TV [46]. The
model also considers market competition in the two scenarios. The analysis shows
that increased ATT levels lower profits and decrease entry in the free-to-air model.
In contrast, in the pay-TV regime, lower income from ads is compensated by higher
subscription fees, therefore the profits and the number of channels are unaffected.
In our model, we explicitly consider the limited information aspects related to ad
avoidance technology and its detection. As a result, content providers must invest
in detection technologies to be able to distinguish between consumers that utilize
AATs and those who do not engage in such activities. Such user differentiation en-
ables content providers to deploy a personalized approach, treating each user indi-
vidually and applying an appropriate monetization strategy per user. It also enables
deployment of countermeasures that affect only the AAT users (e.g., preventing ac-
cess to the content unless they turn off AATs or subscribe). A personalized approach
is not possible in the traditional TV market, as providers do not have technological
means to detect who is using AAT (e.g., fast-forwarding through ads). Therefore, the
previous work has only considered an aggregate strategy for a content provider, that
is applied across all the users, regardless of whether they use AATs or not. In such a
scenario, instead of impacting only AAT users, the countermeasures taken to offset
losses due to AATs either affect all, or even worse, only the non-AAT users. For
example, an increased advertisement level only impacts non-AAT users (while AAT
users can fast-forward through ads). Thus, there are no incentives for AAT users
to change their behavior. On the contrary, such an approach increases incentives
to adopt AATs. In our model, the countermeasures directly affect the AAT users
and therefore discourage their use of AATs. Moreover, our model leads to stronger
differentiation since AAT users are not of any value to advertisers as online AATs
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block all available ads, whereas in the TV market, users who fast-forward through
ads are still exposed to traces of marketing content.
Further academic works on advertisement circumvention have been undertaken
in the context of “old media” from a legal or ethical perspective [28, 43, 49]. Addi-
tional recent work has been focused on improvements of the mechanisms for ad allo-
cations and techniques to lower the impact of manipulation by malicious actors. See,
for example, research papers on ad auctions (e.g., [23, 50]) and click fraud [32, 34].
3 Background
In this section, we discuss the drivers of consumer resistance to advertisements and
their propensity for ad blocking. We also review existing technologies for ad avoid-
ance and approaches by website owners to detect ad-blocking softwares.
3.1 Why do consumers block ads?
Previous research has studied a variety of ad avoidance behaviors such as elimi-
nating, ignoring or quickly flipping past commercial messages [45]. Graphical and
auditory stimuli are frequently considered annoying or unconvincing, irrespective
of the actual information content [45]. Online ads are more likely to be avoided if
consumers hold expectations of a negative experience, are generally skeptical to-
wards the advertisements or contest their relevance [31]. Further, if a user perceives
an interruption in his primary interaction objective or considers ads to clutter his
workspace, marketing messages are more likely to be blocked or ignored [20].
Further, sophisticated online advertising approaches such as personalized, behav-
ioral or targeted delivery mechanisms rely on the collection and use of data about
users’ Web interactions. Different studies have documented users’ misgivings and
privacy concerns about these practices. For example, in an interview study of 1000
adult consumers, 66% objected to tailored ads [48]. Due to the pervasiveness of
these concerns, (self-)regulatory and technical proposals are under consideration,
e.g., that would allow users to opt-out from such data collection practices by sign-
ing up for a Do-Not-Track list [22]. At the same time, users can attempt to block
advertisements altogether when suspecting that they are triggered by the tracking of
their online trails. In addition to privacy issues, online advertisements also present
security threats. Infected online ads are often used to compromise ad viewers’ ma-
chines and spread malware [44] or direct the machines to participate in ad-fraud
scams. Users do not even have to click on ads to trigger malware and the conse-
quences can be devastating. In a sophisticated ad-fraud scheme discovered in 2012,
shutting down malicious servers that orchestrate the fraud and control victims’ ma-
chines would lead to all the victims losing their Internet service [14]. Most of these
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users were even unaware that their machines have been infected and mitigation of
the effects of the scam represented a big challenge.
A survey of 1543 AdBlock Plus users further evidenced that privacy and security
concerns are major factors to select this application [36]. Avoiding distractions and
improving website load time performance, however, are the dominating reasons.
Interestingly, the lowest score of importance was given to ideological reasons. See
Table 1 for the full results [36].
Table 1 Survey results: Why do consumers use Adblock Plus?
Reasons No Opinion Not Somewhat ImportantImportant Important
Distracting animations and sound 4.3% 5.6% 15.6% 74.5%
Offensive/inappropriate ad content 8.0% 20.1% 23.3% 48.6%
Reduce page load time and bandwidth use 5.7% 10.1% 22.6% 61.6%
Missing separation between ads and content 13.2% 11.5% 27.5% 47.8%
Privacy concerns 8.3% 9.9% 27.5% 54.3%
Security concerns 8.0% 9.7% 26.1% 56.3%
Ideological reasons 20.2% 32.0% 24.2% 23.7%
3.2 What technologies are involved?
Ad-blocking tools prevent online ads from being downloaded and displayed on
users’ screens as they browse the Web. They can also be considered privacy-
preserving tools as some forms of online tracking (e.g., via cookies) can be evaded.
Typically, ad-blocking tools are available as free downloadable plug-ins and exist for
several Web browsers. For example, AdblockPlus is open-source and maintained by
an international community of voluntary helpers. Internet Explorer 9 includes a di-
rectly embedded functionality primarily used for tracking protection, but also allows
to block some unwanted content.
Ad-blocking tools rely on two mechanisms to block ads: (i) Prevent loading
of elements whose URLs match filter rules used to classify elements as ads, and
(ii) Hide page elements that match a Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) selector. Users
can subscribe to different community-generated filter lists or manually specify fil-
tering rules themselves. They can also decide to allow loading of some elements of a
page or to turn-off ad-blocking on specific pages or websites. However, this feature
is not widely used among Adblock users [36].
Ad-blocking causes revenue loss for advertisers and ad networks but it has the
most significant impact on websites whose business model is based on online ad-
vertising. The majority of websites today rely on ad revenue, whereas only a few
websites have successfully implemented subscription and membership-based sys-
tems for revenue. Therefore, it is understandable that site operators might want to
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discourage or thwart ad-blocking. In particular, a website can detect the use of ad-
blocking tools with a JavaScript that executes after the page is loaded and verifies
that the ads are displayed. Then, the website could take one of the following coun-
termeasures: (i) inform users about adverse effects of ad-blocking on the website
and ask them to turn it off; (ii) prevent users from accessing the content unless they
disable ad-blocking; (iii) embed ads in a way that ad-blocking filters cannot easily
differentiate ads from content; (iv) tie the functionality of websites to the download
of ad elements; and (v) offer users to pay subscription fees for ad-free content.
Both the ad-blocking and detection tools currently come at a very low cost. The
former requires the user to install a browser plug-in and subscribe to filter lists. As
for detecting ad-blocking, the required JavaScript code is easily available online.
4 Analysis Overview and Assumptions
We propose a game-theoretic model of the informational consequences of con-
sumers’ ad circumvention and website owners’ detection of these practices. In our
analysis, we model the strategic interactions between a generic website W and a user
U and we iteratively consider the following three cases: (i) without the presence
of ad blocking and ad circumvention detection technologies; (ii) with ad blocking
but no detection, and (iii) where both technologies are available to consumers and
website owners, respectively. Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the terms
“website” and “website owner” interchangeably.
A key assumption we make is that the website attempts to analyze users indi-
vidually. A number of technologies exist to implement various forms of conditional
content and ad delivery (see, for example, [27]) ranging from tailoring a website’s
appearance to the type of browser and operation system in use by the consumer. Note
that the individualized analysis does not necessarily translate into unique monetiza-
tion strategies for each user.
Website owners can utilize two canonical types of monetization strategies in re-
sponse to a particular user: either employ ad-financed content delivery or propose
a micropayment for access to content (as a representative subcase of a wider range
of payment-based strategies, such as subscriptions). The consideration of micro-
payments for newspaper content is extremely timely. Not only has the debate about
micropayment schemes for news and other digital content been fought very passion-
ately over the last few years [30, 40]; But from an actual deployment point of view,
easy-to-manage systems are now available, for example, One Pass from Google [8]
or PayPal for Digital Goods [15]. And consumers seem more willing than ever to
accept small charges in response for immediate content or entertainment needs [40].
We further assume that the website is aware of the user’s valuation of content, for
example, because of the cooperation with ad networks, inference about the resources
the user is trying to access or previous interactions. In practice, websites work on
obtaining such information and use it to, for example, compute appropriate prices
for their services or content (e.g., New York Times’ subscription price is based on
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the estimates of readers’ valuations of the content, which is set such that the current
paywall system should be accepted by a certain fraction of their readership [9]). Our
analysis can also be easily extended to introduce uncertainty about user’s content
preferences from the content providers’ perspective.
Not all aspects about user behavior are immediately observable without sophisti-
cated detection technologies. In particular, the website cannot easily deduce whether
the consumer is taking advantage of ad-blocking tools. This is especially the prob-
lem in the impression-based ad revenue model, in which the website obtains ad
revenue for each ad displayed to its visitors. For example, if the feedback cycle be-
tween the ad network and the website is not real-time then payoff consequences of
ad avoidance are only realized at a later time. In the click-based ad revenue model, a
website gets paid for users’ clicks that get reported to the ad network, thus perhaps
enabling more direct and immediate control. The absence of signals could indicate
to ad networks (and websites) a change in the user’s behavior (e.g., use of AB soft-
ware). The website can mitigate this information disadvantage by investing in tech-
nologies to detect ad avoidance. In this work, we focus on impression-based model
and we note that the similar analysis can be provided for the click-based model.
Based on these assumptions, we model each website visit as a sequential game
between the two players, a website W and a user U , to highlight the informational
and strategic aspects of the interactions. We represent the different cases as game
trees (see Figures 1 and 2) with the notation provided in Table 2. In each game, the
players can choose from the corresponding strategy sets and the payoffs achieved at
the end of the game are represented in a format (PW , PU ), where PW and PU are total
payoffs of W and U , respectively.
Table 2 Symbols for the game-theoretic models.
Symbol Definition
b User’s ”benefit“ of viewing content
c User’s ”cost“ of viewing ads
s Subscription fee
ri Ad Network’s per-impression ad revenue
CB Cost of using AB software
CD Cost of detecting AB software
α Belief about the reached information set
PW Website’s total payoff
PU User’s total payoff
AF Ad-financed content
FF Fee-financed content (micropayments)
DI Invest in detection of AB softwares
NI No investment in detection of AB softwares
B Block ads
A Abstain from blocking ads
P Pay subscription
N Not pay subscription
(x|y) First (x) and second (y) action of a player
(x,y) Strategy profile: (first mover,second mover)
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5 Game-theoretic Models
In this section, we introduce game-theoretic models that capture strategic interac-
tions of a website W and a user U. For each model, we present analysis methodology
and the obtained results.
5.1 Model 1: No Blocking and No Detection
We introduce the reader to our approach by first proposing a basic model of the inter-
action between websites and users in which no ad-blocking or detection technolo-
gies are used by users and websites, respectively. Afterwards, we slowly increase
the complexity of the model to account for ad avoidance and countermeasures.
5.1.1 Model Setup: An Extensive Form Game with Complete Information
The content provider selects between fee-financed (e.g., micropayments) and ad-
financed monetizing scheme for his content (denoted by FF and AF, respectively).
If presented with a website that solicits a fee to access its content, users can elect to
transmit a payment, P, or to deny payment and forfeit access, N. The website will
either earn positive revenues from the ad impression, ri, or from the micropayment,
s. The consumer receives a benefit, b, from accessing the content and pays either the
fee, s, or has a cost c due to accepting ads. The subscription fee s is determined by
the content provider and it is the same for all the users, because it has been shown
that price discrimination is not economically optimal for providers [16] and because
of users’ protest (e.g., case of Amazon [4]). Determining the optimal price is not
the goal of this work, but is certainly noteworthy to explore. The cost c captures all
the negative aspects of receiving ads from the users’ point of view (summarized in
Table 1). Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics of the basic model.
W
U
P N
FF AF
(s,b− s) (0,0)
(ri,b− c)
Fig. 1 Model 1 - Game tree for the basic model with no blocking and no detection.
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5.1.2 Analysis Methodology: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
The basic model belongs to the class of perfect and complete information exten-
sive form games. In these games, each player always knows the previous moves
of all players when he has to make his move. In [25], it is proven that every finite
extensive-form game of perfect information has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
We use a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) solution concept that is a re-
finement of a Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. In game theory, a strategy profile
is a SPNE if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game.
A common method for determining SPNE is backward induction and we apply
it in our analysis. Backward induction can be applied to any finite game of perfect
information. This technique eliminates incredible equilibria and assumes that: (i) the
players can reliably forecast the behavior of other players and (ii) the players believe
the other players can do the same. In the game defined by Figure 1, the user knows
that he is the player that has the last move. Hence, for each possible move of the
website the user selects his best response. For example, if the website plays FF , the
user concludes that with move P he obtains the best payoff if and only if b > s.
Now we consider how the website chooses his best strategy using backward in-
duction. Let us assume that b > s. The website then knows that if it plays FF , the
user’s best response is P, which results in the payoff of s for the website. However,
if the website plays AF , its payoff would be ri. Hence, the website’s best response is
FF , if s > ri. In summary, if b > s and s > ri strategy profile (FF,P) is the SPNE of
the game in Figure 1. Table 3 summarizes all possible SPNE of the defined game.
5.1.3 Results
Following this methodology, Table 3 summarizes all possible SPNE of the defined
game, considering different values of game parameters.
Table 3 SPNE of Game Model 1.
b > s
s > ri (FF, P)
s < ri (AF, P)
b < s (AF, N)
It follows that a website owner would only implement fee-financed revenue
scheme when users’ value of the provided content is sufficiently high, b > s, and
the expected ad-revenue does not exceed fee payments, s > ri. The first condition is
relatively difficult to assess for a large number of diverse users if the revenue policy
cannot be set adaptively for each consumer. In contrast, the second condition allows
for a more straightforward calculation – at least for an impression-based ad model.
We address the impact of the heterogeneity of the users in simulations (Section 6).
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5.2 Model 2: Blocking, Detection vs. No Detection
In the following, we extend the analysis to include consumers having the opportu-
nity to utilize ad-blocking software and website owners to potentially respond by
investing in detection technologies. The expanded game is represented in Figure 2.
W
U
W
U
P N
FF AF
B
W
U
P N
FF AF
A
DI
U
W
U
P N
FF AF
B
W
U
P N
FF AF
A
NI
(s− CD, b− s− CB)(−CD,−CB)
(−CD,−CB)
(s− CD, b− s) (−CD, 0)
(ri − CD, b− c)
(s, b− s− CB) (0,−CB)
(0, b− CB)
(s, b− s) (0, 0)
(ri, b− c)
[α] [1− α]
Figure 1: Model 2 - Game tree for ad-blocking with and without detection
technologies.
1
ig. 2 Model 2 - a e tree for ad-blocking with and without detection technologies.
5.2.1 Model Setup: An Extensive Form Game with Imperfect Information
Consumers now have the option to block ads, B, at cost CB, or to abstain from ad-
blocking, A, which does not incur any direct cost. We assume that websites are aware
of the possibility of ad-blocking, but without an investment in detection technolo-
gies, NI, are not able to differentiate between users with and without AB tools and
thus hold only imperfect information about the user’s action and its payoff conse-
quences. In contrast, when the website is equipped with detection technologies, DI,
at cost CD, the information barrier is resolved. The informational consequences are
easily discernible in Figure 2 by observing the dotted lines between information sets
that indicate the website’s uncertainty about the reached state in the game and the
eventual outcomes. Websites have to formulate a probabilistic assessment α of the
reached state of the game, following the user’s decision to block ads or to abstain.
We further break down the game into two subgames concerning the website’s
decision to invest or not in detection of AB software, as highlighted by the left
and right boxes in Figure 2, respectively. The analysis of the lefthand side subgame
in Figure 2 (i.e., when website plays DI) is similar to the calculation of SPNE,
presented in Section 5.1.2. Using the same methodology we obtain SPNE of this
subgame and present the obtained results later in Table 5.
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5.2.2 Analysis Methodology: Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
The subgame in the righthand side of the game in Figure 2 belongs to the class of
complete imperfect sequential games, because one player does not have information
about the opponent’s action played in the previous stage of the game. In other words,
the website owner does not know whether the user has already installed AB software
or not, when he wants to choose the monetization strategy for the website’s content
(i.e., use ad-financed or fee-financed strategy).
Next, we discuss the game-theoretic concept of the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equi-
librium (PBNE) that helps us get an insight into the strategic behavior of players in
such games. PBNE was developed in order to refine the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
concept and remove implausible equilibria in sequential games [26]. More specif-
ically, the concept of PBNE is defined by four Bayes requirements that eliminate
unwanted subgame-perfect equilibria [35]. We discuss these requirements consider-
ing the defined subgame represented in the righthand side box in Figure 2.
Requirement 1: The player with the move must have a belief about which node
in the information set has been reached by the play of the game. For example, in
Figure 2 the website believes that the user installed AB with a probability of α .
Requirement 2: At the PBNE strategy profile, players must be sequentially ra-
tional given the players’ beliefs. A strategy profile is sequentially rational if and only
if the expected payoff of the player who has the move at that information set is max-
imal given the strategies played by all the other players. For example, in Figure 2
the website should calculate its expected payoff for playing AF and FF , given its
belief α and choose the strategy that maximizes its expected payoff. Given website
belief, the expected payoff from playing FF is α×s+(1−α)×s = s. The expected
payoff from playing AF is α×0+(1−α)× ri = (1−α)ri. Hence if α > ri−sri , the
website plays FF to be sequentially rational.
Requirement 3: The player must update his belief at the PBNE to remove im-
plausible equilibria of BNE on the equilibrium path. These beliefs are determined by
Bayes’ rule and the players’ equilibrium strategies. In other words, players should
first calculate the equilibrium paths of the complete perfect information game. If
the calculated strategy that satisfies sequential rationality is on the equilibrium path,
there is no uncertainty for the player at the PBNE (i.e., α equals 0 or 1).
Requirement 4: Finally, the belief should be updated considering the sequential
rationality and players’ equilibrium strategies where it is possible.
In the righthand subgame presented in Figure 2, if b > s, s < ri, and CB > c there
exists an equilibrium path of (A|P,AF). Although, the user cannot play P when the
website deploys AF strategy, we use A|P notation to represent the full strategy pro-
file of the user at the equilibrium path. This means that if α < ri−sri , the PBNE is
(A|P,AF ;α = 0) (i.e., Requirement 3). Requiring that each player have a belief and
act optimally given this belief suffices to eliminate the implausible equilibria for the
belief of 0 < α < ri−sri . But, if α >
ri−s
ri
, the PBNE is (A|P,FF ;α), because we can-
not eliminate any implausible equilibria for this strategy profile (i.e., Requirement
4). Similar calculations can be made for other cases.
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5.2.3 Results
Applying this methodology, we can derive results presented in tabular fashion for
the righthand side (Table 4) and the lefthand side (Table 5) of Figure 2.
Table 4 PBNE of submodel without detection.
CB < c CB > c
b > s
s > ri (A|P, FF; α = 0) (A|P, FF; α = 0)
s < ri (A|P, FF; α) α > ri−sri (A|P, FF; α) α >
ri−s
ri
(B|P, AF; α) α < ri−sri (A|P, AF; α = 0)
b < s (B|N, AF; α = 1) (A|N, AF; α = 0)
If website owners do not invest in detection, we observe that ad blocking happens
in two instances (see Table 4). First, when consumers do not value the content highly
enough to pay a fee (b < s), and ad-blocking is cheap relative to the cost of viewing
ads (CB < c). Second, if website owners believe it to be unlikely that consumers
block ads (α < ri−sri ) and ad-blocking is cheap, then ad avoidance can persist even
when users value the content sufficiently (b > s). In both cases, the user will exploit
his information advantage to avoid ad clutter while the website will gain nothing
through the interaction (because it mistakenly relies on ad-financed strategy, AF).
Table 5 SPNE of submodel with detection.
CB < c− s CB > c− s
b > s
s > ri (A|P, FF)
s < ri (B|P, FF) (A|P, AF)
CB < c−b CB > c−b
b < s
(B|N, FF) (A|N, AF)(B|N, AF)
In contrast, with an investment in detection technology the website owner can
partially crowd out the ill-effects of ad avoidance. He can successfully solicit a
micropayment even when ad-blocking technology is cheap as long as the user values
the content sufficiently (see Table 5). However, the website will still not extract
any benefits from a user who does not value the content highly and has access to
cheap ad-blocking technology. Interestingly, the website is indifferent in the latter
case about allowing the user to access the content freely (with blocked ads) or not.
Importantly, the introduction of detection technology also lowers the threshold of
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what a user considers to be cheap ad-blocking, i.e., the consumer now internalizes
the cost of the expected micropayment when making the assessment (CB < c− s).
We now proceed to visualize the space of equilibria from a different perspec-
tive in Figures 3 and 4 by integrating the results of the subgames from the lefthand
and righthand side of Figure 2. The figures show how the equilibrium strategies
of the players depend on the cost of detection, CD, and ad-blocking, CB, technolo-
gies, respectively. We break down the results based on the equilibrium beliefs of
the website, i.e., Figure 3 is split according to the threshold belief, α∗ = ri−sri . Fig-
ure 4 shows the cases where the website is certain about the consumer’s strate-
gies. In addition (and not visualized), for the case of high content value, b > s,
and low ad-revenue, s > ri, we also find that the website and the user select
PBNE 1 = (NI|FF,A|P;α = 0), independently of CB and CD.
Ca  2.1
PBNE 2:
(DI|AF, A|P; α)
(NI|FF, A|P; α)
α > (ri – s)/ri
ri – s CD
CB
c – s PBNE 3:
(DI|AF, A|P; α)
(DI|FF, B|P; α)
α < (ri – s)/ri
ri
(NI|AF, B|P;α)
(NI|AF, A|P; α=0)
s
c – s
c
CB
CD
PBNE 4:
PBNE 5:
PBNE 6: PBNE 7:
Fig. 3 Case 2: Users value the content and are willing to pay subscription fees (b> s). The website
prefers ad-financed to fee-financed monetization strategy (ri > s).
Case 3
(DI|AF, A|N)
(NI|AF, B|N; α=1)
ri CD
CB
c – b
(NI|AF, A|N; α=0)
c
PBNE 8:
PBNE 9:
SPNE 1:
Fig. 4 Case 3: Users do not value content sufficiently to pay subscription fees (b < s).
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6 Simulation approach and results
Our analysis in Section 5 provides a framework that websites can use to determine
which countermeasures concerning ad avoidance they should use to maximize the
revenue. Our results show that the best response depends on the type of users that a
given website serves. In this section, we illustrate how our framework can be used to
determine the best response while taking into account different assumptions about
user heterogeneity with respect to user perception of content and ads.
6.1 Simulation Setup
We model the application of our framework to a popular website with specific and
unique content that is of a high value to its visitors (e.g., Financial Times). Financial
Times is a good example as it is a content provider that deploys both monetization
strategies: fee-financed and ad-financed. Our game-theoretic analysis shows that the
outcome of the game depends mostly on the parameters that characterize visitors
of a given website: users’ benefit of viewing the content, users’ cost of viewing
ads with the content and ad revenue that the website earns for each pageview. As
discussed in Section 4, the values of per-impression ad revenue and users’ benefit
of viewing the content are available to the stakeholders, namely websites and ad
networks. It is more difficult to obtain exact values for users’ cost of viewing ads
and to do so, websites could perhaps position themselves with respect to the reasons
users have named in the survey on why they block ads (Table 1). Depending on how
much they match users’ criteria, they can estimate their visitors’ costs. In addition,
as we will show, knowing the distribution of such a variable for which the relevant
parameter is the fraction of users who use ad-blocking software (e.g., available from
Firefox statistics) is sufficient for the model.
We rely on Web analytics providers, Alexa and Google’s DoubleClick Ad Plan-
ner, to obtain the data based on which we can estimate the parameter values. We use
the following values in our evaluations:
1. The website receives 1 million pageviews per day, as reported by Google’s Dou-
bleClick Ad Planner [2].
2. In the case of fee-financed content, we consider a micropayment of s = $0.321
per pageview. We compute this value based on the Financial Times’ subscription
fee of $4.99 per week [12] and the 2.22 average number of pageviews per visitor
per day, as reported by Alexa [1]. As explained in Section 5, the subscription fee
is the same for all users.
3. We model the impression-based ad revenue per pageview with a beta distribution
represented in Figure 5 based on the estimated cost-per-mille (CPM) between $1
and several tens of dollars [6]. CPM is a cost that advertisers pay for thousand
impressions and thus we compute the per-pageview ad revenue as CPM/1000
for the considered values of CPM. We select skewed distribution as most of ad-
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vertisers pay CPM in the range of couple of dollars and only a very few major
advertisers pay a high CPM in the order of tens of dollars. The total ad revenue
that the website can earn in our model is in the range of the reported ad revenues
by the top blog websites [3] with a similar number of daily pageviews [2].
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Fig. 5 Distribution of user-generated impression-based ad revenue per pageview.
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Fig. 6 Distribution of users’ benefits of viewing content per pageview.
4. Benefit b (expressed in US dollars) of users viewing the content (Figure 6)
is drawn from a beta distribution (in the range of values comparable to the
impression-based ad revenue per pageview), such that 25% of the visitors would
opt for fee-financed content (i.e., has b > s). This number is in compliance with
25% of Financial Times’s visitors paying for digital subscriptions [11]. In addi-
tion, for most of the websites users’ benefits are high due to users’ self-selection
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bias. The exact values are not necessary, the important parameter is the fraction
of users accepting to pay the subscription fees.
5. We consider a population of visitors that consists of: (i) a fraction (1− γ) of
users who are indifferent about ads and therefore do not use AB software and
(ii) a fraction γ of users who are heterogenous in how much they like or dislike
ads and therefore might use AB software. Users who are indifferent about ads
associate a small cost (expressed in US dollars) to viewing online ads. Other
users, who are not indifferent about ads, have a higher cost of viewing ads, that
can even surpass the benefit they associate to viewing the content. However, it
does not necessarily mean that all of them use AB software. Their decision on
whether to use AB software (Block) or not (Abstain) then depends on the cost of
viewing ads with respect to the values of other parameters (e.g., their valuation
of the content or the cost of using AB software). Therefore, the parameter c
that represents users’ costs of viewing ads is drawn from a bimodal distribution
(Figure 7), that assigns a small cost to the users indifferent about ads (the first
mode of the distribution) and higher costs to other users (the second mode). The
values of c are in the range comparable to the impression-based ad revenue per
pageview and users’ valuation of the content. Figure 7 depicts the distribution for
γ = 0.5. We vary the value of γ in the simulations.
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Fig. 7 Distribution of users’ costs of viewing ads per pageview: Fraction (1−γ) of users indifferent
to ads; Fraction γ of users who choose between Abstain (no AB software) and Block (using AB
software).
6. In practice, the cost of blocking ads (CB) corresponds to the cost of installing and
maintaining a browser add-on and subscribing to filter lists that define blocking
rules. At the moment, the cost (CD) of detecting AB software on users’ machines
corresponds to the cost of including a specific Javascript into Web pages. Nowa-
days, both of these costs (expressed in US dollars) are very small and we use
values of CB = $0.01 CD = $0.001 for our simulations. Note that these values
represent costs per interaction and have such a low value as they are factored
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out on millions of users (for CD) and a number of pageviews per day (for CB).
These costs could increase if an arms race develops between AB softwares and
detection tools, as it was the case with pop-up ads and pop-up blockers [5]. We
evaluate the effect of higher costs of blocking and detection later in the analysis.
6.2 Results
We simulate the interaction between the website and the population of users, based
on our game-theoretic model and parameter values described above. The web-
site treats each user individually and applies the framework to each of the visi-
tors. We then aggregate the results of the interactions to represent the outcomes
for the entire population of visitors. The fraction (γ) of users that might po-
tentially install AB software is a variable in our simulations. For each value of
γ ∈ {0.05,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5}, we generate a corresponding bimodal distribution
(as in Figure 7) that assigns the values to users’ costs of viewing ads (c). The values
of all other parameters remain fixed.
First, we compare the revenues that the website obtains by deploying three differ-
ent monetizing strategies: (i) serving ad-financed content (AF model) to all visitors,
regardless of whether they use AB software or not; (ii) serving fee-financed (FF)
content, where users have to pay a subscription fee in order to access the content;
(iii) game-theoretic approach (GT model) where a website chooses an appropriate
strategy according to our analysis, and can either serve ad-financed or fee-financed
content to different users. Figure 8 depicts the daily revenue of the website, for the
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Fig. 8 Website’s daily revenue (in US dollars) with different monetizing models.
three models, depending on the fraction of users that might potentially block ads.
We observe that the revenue that the website obtains with GT monetizing model is
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superior to using pure fee-financed (FF) or ad-financed models (AF). The reason-
ing behind such a result is as follows. In the AF model, users with AB software
do not generate ad revenue for the website, as ad impressions are blocked on their
machines. The higher is the potential number of users with AB software (γ), the
higher is the revenue loss for the website. In the FF model, only users who value
the content more than the subscription fee are willing to pay, thus the revenue is
not influenced by the users who use AB, only by the number of subscriptions. FF
revenue depends on the subscription fee that the website can charge, which mostly
depends on the content it serves and how valuable it is to its visitors. The GT model
represents a compromise between AF and FF models. For users who dislike ads, but
value content enough to pay subscription fees, the website will apply the FF strat-
egy. With AF, the website cannot make profit out of these users as they block ads.
For users who do not dislike ads as much, the website might either use FF or AF
strategy, whichever is more profitable. Thus, the GT model enables the website to
take into account users’ heterogeneity and maximize its profit. In Figure 9 we show
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Fig. 9 Fraction of visitors that generate revenue for each monetizing model.
the fraction of users that generate profit for the website with the three monetizing
models. The curve labeled AF-Block represents the fraction of users from which the
website profits in the AF model. In this model, the ad revenue is generated only by
the users without AB software. Note that nevertheless all users obtain the content.
The difference between the AF-Block curve and 1 corresponds to the fraction of
users who use AB software in the AF model. In the fee-financed (FF) model, only
the users who opt to pay the subscription generate the revenue for the website and
obtain the content (FF curve2). In the GT model, the website profits from serving
ad-financed content to a fraction of users (GT-AF curve) and fee-financed content
to another fraction of users (GT-FF curve). The sum of these two corresponds to
the total fraction of users that the website can generate revenue from, represented
2 Note that FF curve overlaps with GT-FF curve.
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with GT-Block curve. The remaining fraction of users (i.e., the difference between
the GT-Block curve and 1) corresponds to the users with AB software in the GT
model. Users served with ad-financed content are those who: (i) accept to view
ads in exchange for free content (for which the outcome of the game is PBNE 9:
(NI|AF,A|N;α = 0)), or (ii) value the content more than they dislike ads, but not
enough to pay the subscription fee for ads-free content (for which the outcome of
the game is SPNE 1: (DI|AF,A|N)). Users who are served fee-financed content are
those who: (i) dislike ads but value the content, or (ii) users who accept ads but also
value the content, thus leaving the choice to the website that could decide to offer
the subscription model to such users as it might be more profitable. These are the
users for which the outcome of the game is PBNE 1: (NI|FF,A|P;α = 0). We ob-
serve that the total fraction of users that generate the revenue for the website in the
GT model (GT-Block) is higher than in either AF or FF model.
Users who do not generate revenue and do not obtain the content in the GT model
are those who dislike ads and do not value the content enough to pay subscription
fees. This case corresponds to PBNE 8: (NI|AF,B|N;α = 1). Note that the impact of
the users with AB software is smaller in the GT model, and we see that in the worst
case about 27% blocks ads (and generate revenue loss for the website) compared to
the 50% in the AF model. These results are in line with the results in Figure 8 and
explain why the website earns more with the GT monetizing model. In the worst
case, the GT revenue is around 16% higher than FF revenue and it may not seem
justified to deploy the GT model for that increment in the revenue. However, one
major advantage of the GT model is that it maximizes the number of users who
obtain the content (73% in the GT model compared to 25% in the FF model, in
the worst case). We conclude that the GT model allows the website to adapt its
monetizing strategy such that it maximizes the number of visitors from whom it
profits, as well as its visibility or impact factor.
As discussed previously, the website can deploy a strategy of making it more
difficult for AB software to filter out and block ads. In our GT model, this action
can be represented with an increase in the users’ cost of blocking ads and a higher
investment in the detection. We simulate the effect of a higher ad-blocking and in-
vestment costs (CB ∈ 0.01,0.1,0.5,0.7,1 and CD = $0.1)) and represent the results
in Figure 10. Different curves correspond to the fraction of users that the website
can profit from in the GT model, considering a different cost of ad-blocking. We
observe that the fraction of users that will block ad-financed content decreases with
the increase in the cost of blocking ads. As both the website and users are behaving
strategically in the GT model, with the higher cost rational users deter from blocking
ads and it shows that the website has a good return-on-investment with the strategy
of making ad-blocking more difficult.
In summary, we have illustrated how a website can use our framework in practice
as a decision help in addition to the content provider’s overall business strategy and
factors that are outside the scope of our model. We have demonstrated how a website
maximizes its revenue with a strategic choice of its best response when facing users
with different preferences with respect to ads and content. Such a strategic behavior
allows for the website to maximize the number of users from which it can profit,
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Fig. 10 Fraction of visitors that generate revenue in the GT model, considering higher blocking
and detection costs.
as well as to apply the strategy that maximizes the profit. Users’ strategic behavior
allows them to maximize their utility as well, by having a choice of viewing ad-
financed or fee-financed content.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of the consequences of ad avoid-
ance on the business model of content providers. We develop a framework usable
by content providers to ponder their options to mitigate the consequences of ad-
avoidance technologies. We carefully devise and analyze a game-theoretic model
of the impression-based ad revenue mechanism and illustrate with simulations the
impact of different strategies under parameter assumptions motivated by real-world
data. Our analysis shows that deploying a game-theoretic approach, i.e., strategi-
cally applying fee-financed or ad-financed monetization strategy, and treating each
user individually yields higher revenues for publishers, compared to deploying one
strategy across all users. Also, understanding the distribution of users’ aversion to
ads and valuation of the content is essential for publishers to make a well-informed
decision. We expect that our modeling and simulation assumptions are a reason-
able, but likely not a perfect fit for every situation involving content providers and
ad avoiders. In future work, we intend to further explore deviations from our mod-
eling assumptions and expand our framework to additional problem areas.
Our contribution is only a first step to account for the complicated interactions
between ad avoidance and content monetization. For example, a promising area for
additional work is to more carefully address the impact of the negative feedback
spiral caused by the adoption of ad-blocking under the presence of limited informa-
tion. A loss of revenue through an increase of website visitors who use ad-blocking
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software will frequently trigger a more aggressive pursuit of advertisement opportu-
nities. Those might even include consumer-unfriendly affiliate marketing schemes.
While this may create short-term benefits, additional consumers will depart or try to
avoid these practices.
In addition, we aim to consider measures of concentration and interdependency
in the ad industry. For example, a recent study shows that Google-controlled cookies
were present on 97 of the top 100 websites [19]. The same study also documents
the growing intricacy of tracking attempts that will make it very difficult for users
to find adequate countermeasures in absence of market (self-)regulation.
In conclusion, we expect content providers that serve a technology-minded au-
dience to suffer most from ad avoidance technologies. And, in absence of a broad
consensus between the ad and content industry, on the one side, and consumers,
on the other side, the trend towards blocking of advertisement is likely to grow.
Resistance to user tracking and the desire for ad avoidance are tightly interwoven,
even though we do not model the related long term trends in the moment, i.e., users
rarely become technology-savvy ad avoiders over night. However, the potential for a
significant shift in consumer behavior is large and should not be under-appreciated.3
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